This essay analyzes choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory rst price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to practice and gain experience prior to making a single payo-relevant choice. We found behavior of more experienced sellers to be consistent with benchmark theory: average reserve price for these sellers was independent of the number of bidders in the market and equaled the predicted level. Less experienced sellers however deviated from the theoretical benchmark: on average, they tended to shade reserve price below the predicted level, and positively relate it to the number of bidders.
Introduction
The variety, volume and value of goods sold through auctions are enormous.
Economic agents of many dierent types regularly participate in auctions, to buy as well as to sell. A large experimental literature has emerged investigating buyer behavior in auctions, and substantial progress has been made in understanding to what extent such behavior comports to theoretical predictions.
Little corresponding attention however has been paid to sellers, with few studies documenting or analyzing seller choices.
It is important to ll this lacuna for at least two reasons. First, sellers regularly make critical choices in auctions, such as which format to use, or what reserve price to set. Predictions of price or other variables which ignore this endogeneity therefore stand the risk of being erroneous. And second, the economic theory of auctions makes sharp predictions regarding the choices of payo maximizing sellers. For example, Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) show that with independent, private values a seller using a standard form such as a rst price auction may set a reserve price exceeding her valuation, opening a possibility of ineciency, as such a choice can cause some mutually gainful trades to not occur. They further show that this optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders in the market. Empirical examination of these predictions is thus required to assess the strength of the theory.
In this paper, we study reserve price choices of subjects in the role of sellers in a rst price auction facing automated equilibrium bidding. Our sellers each made a single payo-relevant choice, but were allowed to gather experience through prior practice for a xed amount of time on a graphical interface which simulated auctions and kept track of past outcomes and average revenue. We used a between subjects design, and two treatment variables: the rst was the number of bidders (2 or 4), and the second the length of the practice phase (5 or 15 minutes), as a proxy for the degree of experience.
We found that benchmark theory was capable of explaining behavior of more experienced sellers, whose average reserve prices were independent of the number of bidders, and indistinguishable from the predicted level. Less experienced sellers however chose reserve prices below the predicted level. Their choices also increased with the number of bidders. We then investigated whether augmenting the benchmark model with probability weighting (see Tversky and Kahneman 1992 ) was capable of reconciling the latter ndings. We found such an approach could rationalize why the reserve price increased with the number of bidders, but not why it was below the predicted level.
To our knowledge, only three prior papers have experimentally analyzed the problem of reserve price choice in auctions. Of these, only Chen, Katu²£ák and Ozdenoren (2010;  CKO henceforth) study rst-price auctions: Greenleaf (2004;  Gl henceforth) and Davis, Katok and Kwasnica (2011; DKK henceforth) examine English and second-price auctions respectively. Gl does not report any conformity of observed reserve prices with benchmark predictions. Support for benchmark predictions in DKK is also very weak. CKO nds that reserve prices are in line with benchmark predictions, but this result is not directly comparable with ours, as bidding in their environment was not simulated, but generated by volunteer subjects. In terms of results, DKK is arguably the closest to us, as they also nd that reserve prices chosen increase in the number of bidders and are typically below the benchmark level (we nd this tendency too, but only among less experienced bidders). Further, they nd weak evidence that experience can reduce the discrepancy between predicted and actual choices.
Because there are many dierences in design separating these articles from ours, we defer a detailed discussion and comparison till Section 6, after results have been presented. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical benchmark and Section 3 details experimental design and procedure.
Sections 4 and 5 present our main results. Section 6 discusses the literature.
Section 7 reconsiders the behavior of less experienced sellers, while Section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical benchmark A rich and sophisticated theory has emerged for sealed bid, single unit, winner pay auctions when agents are risk-neutral, bidders are symmetric, and have independent private values, through the work of Vickrey (1961 ), Myerson (1981 , Riley and Samuelson (1981) etc: see Krishna (2010) for a textbook presentation.
Here we state the key results relevant for our experimental implementation, using the notation of Krishna (2010) .
There is one seller and N (potential) bidders. The seller has 0 value for the object. Bidder i has a valuation x i for the object which is the realization of a random variable X i . These random variables X i , i = 1, . . . , N are independently and identically distributed over [0, w] according to the increasing and continuously dierentiable distribution function F , with corresponding density function f . The realization of X i is observed only by bidder i; all else is common knowledge.
We look at a rst price auction where the seller is allowed to set a publicly known reserve price. In such an auction bidders independently and simultaneously submit non-negative bids, and the highest bidder wins and pays the seller his bid in exchange for the object, provided this highest bid is no less than the reserve price. A reserve price r ≥ 0 is a minimum level below which bids are not accepted: if all bids fall short of the reserve price, the object is not sold and the seller earns 0 revenue. Let Y 1 be the highest order statistic of N − 1 of the random variables
, and let G and g respectively be the distribution and density functions of Y 1 . Given r, the rst price auction has a unique symmetric increasing perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid function, and the equilibrium bidding strategy for any bidder with x ≥ r is
Using (1), the seller's expected revenue can be computed as
The optimal or revenue maximizing reserve price can be determined using (2). The rst order condition implies the optimal reserve price r * must satisfy
is the hazard rate function associated with the distribution function F . When λ(.) is increasing, the above condition is also sucient, and the optimal reserve price is given by (3). A remarkable feature of the result is that the optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders. We test this key proposition in this paper.
For our experimental implementation, we assume w = 100 and F is uniform (for which λ is increasing). Further we look at two cases, one with N = 2 and the other with N = 4. This yields r * = 50, using (3), and, using (1),
for v r 0 for v < r
Procedure and treatments
We rst describe our experimental procedure in detail. In any treatment, a subject assumed the role of a seller selling an object facing automated bidders.
Subjects were informed of this fact and also that (i) a seller had 0 value for the object, (ii) each bidder had a privately known valuation for the object which was equally likely to be any integer in {0, .., 100}, (iii) a seller could set any integer in {0, .., 100} as a reserve price, and (iv) every bidder used a particular formula which gave the bid as a function of private valuation and reserve price.
They were explained the rules of the rst price auction with reserve price, told how many bidders were present (2 or 4), and were given the relevant formula, which happened to be the risk-neutral symmetric increasing perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy of the auction game, given above.
A subject had to decide what reserve price to set. Once the choice had been entered on a computer interface (programmed using z-tree, Fischbacher 2007), the program would simulate an auction (generate bidder valuations, produce bids and determine outcome) and report revenue earned. The subject would then be paid a show-up fee and twice revenue earned in private.
We chose to inform sellers about the specic formula being used to generate bids, insuring they had all information required to form the expected payo function. This allowed us to focus on the optimization problem, i.e., the determination of the optimal reserve price, given the payo function. In principle of course sellers face a much more complex problem, where they rst conjecture bidder behavior, then form a payo function on its basis, and then optimize The horizontal axis is reserve price and the vertical axis is revenue. The black and blue dots respectively represent actual and average revenue for a given reserve price.
it. Our procedure, by eliminating the need to conjecture and thereby simplifying the formation aspect of the problem, allows a signicant reduction in this complexity.
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Before making the nal and payo-relevant reserve price choice, subjects could practice on the same interface. Every time they entered a practice reserve price, the program would simulate an auction, display valuations, bids and outcome, and report revenue earned. It would also display this information graphically for every simulation, along with the history of past outcomes and the average (over all practice choices) revenue function (see Figure 1 ).
We had four treatments, based on a 2x2 factorial design, where the treatment variables were the number of bidders, a regular proxy for the degree of competition, and the length of the practice session, as a proxy for the degree of experience, or the level of learning. There were either 2 or 4 bidders, and the practice phases were for either 5 or 15 minutes. We denote corresponding 1 Our procedure thus renders a potentially complex problem, rife with conjectural and strategic considerations, into a comparatively simpler one, and hence allows close focus on one aspect of the laboratory decision problem. We follow Gl and DKK in adopting this procedure. It can also be found outside the auction literature, such as in the Investment treatments in Oprea (2014) , where subjects in the role of investors decide which of two rms to invest in after being made aware of the underlying stochastic processes as well as the strategies of the (automated) rms. treatments by 2L, 4L, 2H, and 4H, where 2 and 4 stand respectively for two bidders and four bidders, and L and H stand respectively for low experience (5 minutes practice) and high experience (15 minutes practice). The practice phases were of xed length: subjects could not terminate practice and move to the nal choice before the full duration was over.
The experiment was conducted at the Institute for Management Technology, Ghaziabad, a business school near Delhi. There was one session per treatment.
Sessions lasted for between 30 and 45 minutes from the time subjects assembled to the time they were paid. Subjects were students pursuing MBA and were recruited through email solicitations and yers. There were 37, 40, 35, and 39 subjects in treatment 2L, 4L, 2H, and 4H respectively.
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After subjects had assembled, each in front of a terminal, instructions (see Appendix) had been handed and read out, numerical exercises done, and questions answered, a demonstration was given of the interface, to familiarize subjects with it. The practice session commenced at the end of the demonstration, after the cessation of which nal and payo-relevant reserve price choice had to be made. Subjects earned | 300 on average. 3
Final reserve prices
In this section we investigate whether sellers' choices of reserve price (nal choice) concord with the theoretical prediction described earlier. Our hypotheses are that reserve prices chosen by subjects in every treatment is 50 on average, and that choices do not dier across treatments.
where r is average observed reserve price and subscripts denote treatments.
The following table gives mean and median reserve price for every treatment.
It also presents results from the tests of the hypotheses that these means and medians are each equal to 50.
2 40 subjects had registered for each session, but there were last minute no-shows in all sessions except 4L, leaving us with 151 subjects in total.
3 The purchasing power parity exchange rate between the Indian Rupee and the US Dollar for 2010 was 16.8 rupees to a dollar according to the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten 2012). The second and fourth rows give two-tailed p-values. *** denotes signicance at the 1% level.
We nd our hypotheses are upheld in treatments 2H and 4H. Average reserve price in these treatments are indistinguishable from 50. Our hypotheses are rejected however for treatments 2L and 4L, in each of which both averages are observed to be less than 50, with all dierences strongly signicant.
We now investigate whether average reserve price is the same across treatments. The following table gives the results of tests comparing average reserve prices. Collecting together results from tables 1 and 2, we nd thus that our benchmark hypotheses are satised for treatments 2H and 4H, i.e., for more experienced subjects. Behavior of these subjects is in accordance with the theoretical predictions presented above. The reserve prices they choose are not dependent on average on the degree of competition as proxied by the number of bidders in the market, and moreover are statistically equal to 50, the predicted level.
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Behavior of less experienced bidders however fail to conform to the benchmark theoretical predictions. Their reserve price choices do depend on the number of bidders they face, and further are signicantly dierent from 50. In particular, we nd that no matter whether there are 2 or 4 bidders, reserve price chosen is less than 50, i.e., reserve price is shaded below the benchmark level, and also that the chosen reserve price is increasing in the number of bidders.
Improving choices with practice
The results presented above are consistent with benchmark theory being accurate in describing behavior of sellers when they face theoretical bidders, provided they have experience. The conjecture that experience causes adherence to the benchmark implies that nal choice is based on information acquired during the practice phase, and hence should be forecasteable using data from the phase.
It further implies that forecast errors should decrease with more practice on average, and so should be lower when 15 rather than 5 minutes are allowed for practice. Additionally, since there is no reason for the number of bidders present in the market to aect the experience-gathering process in our environment, forecast errors, given length of practice phase, should be independent of the number of bidders. We test the latter two as hypotheses in this section.
We used autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models for this purpose (see e.g. Box and Jenkins 1976 and Hamilton 1994 4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Kruskal-Wallis tests also indicated the samples generated by these two treatments come from the same distribution and population respectively. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov gave an exact p-value of 0.121, and the Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared test with ties gave a p-value of 0.2334.
Consider a subject who recorded a total of T practice choices. We index these from the rst to the last by {0, 1, ..., T } respectively, denote T = {0, 1, ..., T }, and call any t ∈ T a period. Let the practice choice recorded in period t, for any t ∈ T, be denoted p t . Further, let y t be the revenue obtained in period t corresponding to p t . Then a general ARDL specication for forecasting p T +1 , the practice choice the subject would have recorded in period T + 1 had such a period been available, is
The error in any period is assumed to be an independent draw from some stationary distribution with 0 mean and constant variance.
5 If all the T observations are taken for the purpose of forecast (T = T = T * ), then the model in (4) reduces to
If we identify the time at which nal choice is made with T + 1, and assume putative practice choice at this time is indistinguishable from nal choice, absolute forecast error is e = |r −p T +1 |, where r denotes the observed nal choice, andp T +1 is the forecast. Denoting average error by e i , where i indicates treatment, our hypotheses are therefore
Hypotheses : { A : e 2L = e 4L , e 2H = e 4H
B : e 2L > e 2H , e 4L > e 4H
Mean and median errors using the full sample forecasts from (5) are given in the table below. As can be seen, a counterintuitive feature is that errors in the H-treatments are higher than those in the L-treatments. 5 We do not incorporate bid or valuations information from any period in the model, assuming revenue is sucient. Table 3 , our hypotheses are only partly upheld. Tables 3 and 4 shows the number of bidders indeed makes no dierence to average errors (Hypotheses A). However, errors are found to increase with experience, contrary to our hypotheses of a negative relationship.
We probed the data at the level of the subject to understand what may have caused the rejection of Hypotheses B. We found that many subjects in all our treatments chose as nal reserve price a number already entered during the practice phase several times, usually in separate blocks of consecutively repeated trials. Additionally, we found in several cases subjects apparently reaching a decision regarding nal choice, and then practicing somewhat randomly afterward. This pattern was particularly prevalent in the high experience treatments (see Figure 2 , which depicts data for 4 representative subjects, one from each treatment, as illustration). It is possible these subjects would have terminated practice and moved to the nal choice at some point prior to the end of the session had that option been available.
Given these features of the data, it is probable that using the full sample of observed practice choices to determine forecast may yield poor results, particularly in the high experience treatments, since the model would then eectively We adopted the following procedure to account for this diculty. We generated several forecasts for every subject, each using a sub-sample of observations (with the full sample included in the set of sub-samples). The same sub-sample was always used for the p and the y series. We then picked that sub-sample for which error was least. This became the set of observations used to make the forecast for that subject. We then compared average errors across treatments as before.
We picked the set of sub-samples over which to search and optimize in two dierent ways, since no natural standard was available. In either protocol, (i) all observations from the beginning were always contained in every member of the set, so if (p t , t t ) was an element of any member for t > 0, so was (p t−1 , y t−1 ), and hence any member was of the form {(p 0 , y 0 ), ..., (p t , y t )}, and (ii) if all observations upto t constituted a member with t < T , then so did all observations upto t + 1, i.e., if the set {(p 0 , y 0 ), ..., (p t , y t )} was a member and t < T , then {(p 0 , y 0 ), ..., (p t , y t ), (p t+1 , y t+1 )} was also a member. The protocols diered in the method of choosing the minimum t for which {(p 0 , y 0 ), ..., (p t , y t )} became a member. In protocol A this minimum was 100 for every subject who had recorded at least 101 practice choices, and was T for the remainder of subjects (T j for each subject j). 6 For the latter group of subjects therefore, the set of sub-samples was a singleton and only contained the full sample.
7 In protocol P this minimum was the 70 th percentile for every subject.
We present the mean and median errors using both protocols in the following table. 6 The median numbers of observations in 2L, 4L, 2H and 4H were 85, 62.5, 131, 223 respectively. 7 The numbers of subjects with 100 or less practice choices in treatments 2L, 4L, 2H and 4H were 19, 25, 2 and 1 respectively. Hypothesis B is now satised for the treatments with 4 bidders as errors are lower in 4H than in 4L, no matter which protocol is followed. The support for the hypothesis is weaker in the treatments with 2 bidders, as errors decline signicantly with experience unambiguously under protocol A, but ambiguously under protocol P. In the latter case, while the t-test shows no decline, the MannWhitney test shows one, albeit weakly. Overall the optimization procedure thus yields substantial support for Hypotheses B.
Its cost manifests itself in the form of weaker support for Hypotheses A.
While this hypothesis remains satised in the L-treatments, it receives ambiguous support in the H-treatments. Protocol P lends support to the hypothesis and indicates that errors are independent of the number of bidders in the high experience treatments. Protocol A however does not conrm the hypothesis.
The Mann-Whitney test rejects the hypothesis strongly, while the t-test does so weakly.
Related literature
The approach to whether the degree of experience aects seller choices dierentiates us from previous papers. This is because we investigate the impact of the degree of learning or experience through its use as a treatment variable, while others have considered the question within treatment only.
Another key aspect of design which distinguishes the current article from prior essays is the method by which experience is gathered. Here, subjects make a single payo-relevant choice, and learn or gather experience through practice prior to making that relevant choice. Since in reality an experienced seller is one who is already experienced at the time of taking the critical decision, our approach aords an approximation by enabling the gathering of experience before taking payo-relevant decision. Previous designs however have allowed subjects to learn only through making payo-relevant choices, i.e., subjects have played a sequence of paying auctions, and gathered experience by playing. This approach by contrast thus has permitted the gathering of experience while taking payo-relevant decisions.
Subjects in Gl participated in a sequence of 36 English auctions and set a reserve price in each. Bidding was simulated using the appropriate equilibrium strategy. The number of bidders was either 3 or 6, but this was varied within subjects, and not between subjects, as in our case, and so each subject faced 18 auctions with 3 bidders, and 18 with 6. He does not report average chosen reserve price, but his focus on a learning model with regret and rejoicing suggests conformity with benchmark predictions was poor.
30 rst-price auctions were faced in sequence by subjects in CKO. Each auction additionally had two randomly matched bidders, who were also subjects.
They nd some evidence that bidding was in conformity with predictions (see their Table 3 ). Average reserve price was 39.8, while the risk-neutral prediction was 41.7.
8 Additionally, they nd some weak learning eects. To the extent the two designs are comparable, our results on reserve price choices of experienced bidders thus conrm theirs.
As in Gl, where the number of bidders was varied within the treatment, the underlying set of experimental parameters was not stable in CKO. Specically, there were two dierent distribution functions in accordance with which bidder valuations were drawn. One was faced 21 times on average, and the other 9 times. The stability of parameters within treatment, or its absence, is another design feature that separates our paper from others, as DKK also allowed vari-8 They also had a treatment with second-price auctions and found reserve prices there to be indistinguishable from those in the rst-price auction treatment, as predicted. Bidding in the second-price auction however diered sharply from predictions.
ation. Specically, they varied the number of bidders, like Gl, with n either 1, 2, 3, or 4 in some treatments, and either 1, 4, 7, or 10 in others.
A sequence of 60 second-price auctions (explained as English auctions) were faced by subjects in DKK, who had automated equilibrium bidding, like Gl and the current article.
9 They found little support overall for the hypothesis that benchmark theory adequately describes behavior. They did nd some learning eects though, with sellers displaying a slight tendency to set reserve price more in coformity with the benchmark after experiencing more auctions. A key nding in their paper is that reserve price chosen increases with the number of bidders. This holds for the comparison between 2 and 4 bidders as well. They also nd that reserve prices are usually below the benchmark value, and can exceed the predicted level for large number of bidders (7 or more).
Since we also nd, for less experienced bidders, that reserve prices are below the benchmark level and an increase in the number of bidders leads to an increase in reserve price, our results therefore lend support to theirs. Of course a key dierence remains in that we nd conformity with the benchmark for more experienced bidders.
A possible reason for why seller behavior deviated from the benchmark in DKK, while it did not for our more experienced sellers, could be that sellers in DKK faced only 60 auctions, which was not far from the average of the number of practice auctions recorded in our L-treatments. By contrast, our more experienced sellers recorded a mean of over 200 practice auctions, and hence had considerably larger opportunities for learning.
Behavior of less experienced sellers
Our results indicate that experience may be a key dierentiating factor in determining whether behavior can be expected to conform to the benchmark. The role of experience has been looked at in explaining deviations from benchmark bidding, in experiments with automated selling. There is considerable evidence that more experience is associated with bids deviating less from predicted levels (see surveys of results in Kagel 1995 and Kagel and Levin 2008) . Our ndings overall therefore suggest that the degree of experience can impact behavior not 9 Like us, Gl and DKK also informed their subjects about the formula to be used to generate bids. We therefore follow DKK and use a probability weighting approach to investigate whether incorporating such an aspect into the model used to describe behavior of a less experienced seller can help explain our two key ndings: reserve prices chosen by less experienced sellers are (i) below the benchmark level of 50, and (ii) increase with the number of bidders (see Table 1 ). The general idea of probability weighting is that agents behave as if the probabilities of certain events are dierent from their given values. Experimental evidence (see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979) suggests subjects often behave as if they were inating the probabilities of some low probability events and deating the probabilities of some high probability events.
As in the literature (see Wu and Gonzalez 1996 and DKK ), we assume there is a weighting function w(p), mapping actual probability of occurence to [0, 1], with (i) w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1, (ii) w (p) > 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1], and (iii) ∃p ∈ (0, 1) such that w(p) > p and w (p) < 0 for p ∈ (0,p) and w(p) < p and w (p) > 0 for p ∈ (p, 1). 10 (i) implies that probabilities of events with probability 0 or 1 will not get distorted through weighting. (ii) implies that events with higher probabilities will receive higher weights. (iii) implies low probability events will get overweighted, while high probability events will get underweighted. 
We now incorporate probability weighting into the seller's expected revenue function. (6) and (7) then respectively get modied as follows.
We can now apply (9) to predict optimal reserve price choices, provided we assume a specic form for w(.). We look at two alternative and well-discussed single-parameter families: the Tversky-Kahneman function (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) and the Prelec function (Prelec 1998) , which are given sequentially below.
The derivatives of these two functions are as follows.
We calculated optimal reserve prices (rounded to the nearest integer) using (9) through (13) DKK performed a similar exercise, with two dierences. Firstly, they only studied the TK function, and secondly, they xed the value of the parameter at 0.65. They found that the predicted reserve price increased relative to the benchmark with the introduction of weighting. They also obtained a monotone increasing relationship between the predicted reserve and the number of bidders, but only for one of the two value distributions they study.
Our results are summarized in Figure 3 . We too found that the probability weighted optimal reserve prices are usually higher than the unweighted benchmark. This is true for the TK function, for N = 2 as well as N = 4. This is also true for the P function for N = 4. For N = 2, the P function predicts a reserve price which exceeds the benchmark for α < 0.73, and equals it for α ≥ 0.73.
The probability weighting approach is thus unable to concur with our nding (i) above, that less experienced sellers tend to choose lower than benchmark reserve prices.
We further found that the Prelec function yields the prediction that sellers should choose higher reserve prices when the number of bidders is greater. This is in consonance with our nding (ii) above. The TK function yields the same prediction, but only for α < 0.57. For α > 0.59, the predicted reserve price for N = 2 exceeds that for N = 4.
Overall therefore, the probability weighting framework proved somewhat useful, as it helped understand why sellers may choose higher reserve prices when confronted with more bidders. However, it performed poorly in explaining why sellers might reduce reserve prices relative to the benchmark.
11 See Ingersoll (2008) on problems of non-monotonicity associated with the TK function for low values of α. This paper has analyzed reserve price choices of laboratory sellers in a rst price auction facing automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects were allowed to gather experience through practice prior to making a single payo-relevant choice. We found close consonance between predicted and observed outcomes for sellers wth more experience, i.e., those who had faced a longer practice phase. Specically, the reserve price choices of these sellers were at the predicted level, and did not vary with the number of bidders in the market.
The behavior of less experienced sellers deviated markedly from prediction.
They tended to shade reserve price below the benchmark level and increase it in the presence of more bidders. A similar pattern of choices has also been reported by DKK in the context of a second price auction. Further research may be required here to establish whether these tendencies are of a general nature. A probability weighted variant of the standard model was determined to be capable of explaining why the reserve price may increase with the number of bidders, but not why it may fall below the predicted level.
It is well-known that experience can reduce discrepancy between observed and predicted bidding behavior in the laboratory. Our ndings indicate that the degree of experience can perform a similar role for seller choices as well. In aiming to contribute to a better understanding of behavior in auction environments, this article has approached the problem from the side of the seller, or the designer of the mechanism. While auctions and similar mechanisms ll roles of great importance in the economy, there is a paucity of experimental research on seller behavior which needs to be removed to achieve improved analysis and prediction of price formation, trade ows etc. In this regard, questions of which kind of mechanism sellers choose are of at least as much centrality as questions of how sellers choose parameters dening particular mechanisms, which has been the focus of this paper. Questions of choice between mechanisms are left for future research.
You have an object which you have decided to sell using a rst-price auction.
In a rst-price auction, all interested buyers submit a bid each. If all bids fall short of the reserve price (a minimum integer sale price that you set beforehand), the object remains unsold and the revenue from the auction is 0 and you earn 0. Otherwise, if at least one bid exceeds the reserve price, the highest bidder obtains the object and pays whatever he or she bid. This is the revenue from the auction and you earn twice this amount.
You have some information available: (1) There are two buyers interested in obtaining the object. (2) Each of them has a secret valuation for the object which is equally likely to be any integer between (and including) 0 and 100. You can set any reserve price you want, including 0 (no reserve price) and 100 (maximal reserve). The reserve price has to be an integer.
You will shortly face a decision screen. There you will have to set the reserve price. Once you submit your selection, the computer will simulate bidding.
It will draw a valuation for each bidder (a number between and including 0 and 100, randomly drawn), and then generate bids according to the rule given above. If both bidders' valuations fall short of the reserve price, you will earn 0. Otherwise you will earn twice the amount of the highest bid. What reserve price do you wish to set?
To help you decide, before you have to make the nal choice of reserve price, you can practice for up to [5/15] You have an object which you have decided to sell using a rst-price auction.
You have some information available: (1) There are four buyers interested in obtaining the object. (2) Each of them has a secret valuation for the object which is equally likely to be any integer between (and including) 0 and 100.
Bidders use the following rule to determine the bid:
If r be the reserve price set by you (which could be anything between and including 0 and 100), then a bidder whose valuation is v (something between and including 0 and 100) bids You can set any reserve price you want, including 0 (no reserve price) and 100 (maximal reserve). The reserve price has to be an integer.
You will shortly face a decision screen. There you will have to set the reserve price. Once you submit your selection, the computer will simulate bidding. It will draw a valuation for each bidder (a number between and including 0 and 100, randomly drawn), and then generate bids according to the rule given above.
If all bidders' valuations fall short of the reserve price, you will earn 0. Otherwise you will earn twice the amount of the highest bid. What reserve price do you wish to set?
To help you decide, before you have to make the nal choice of reserve price, you can practice for up to [5/15] 
